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In his State of the Union address, President Obama pledged to move forward on important pol icy 
problems with or without Congress. Since then he has issued an executive order directing the federal 
government to purchase more renewable electricitv. and has directed the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to tighten mileage standards on heavy-duty trucks. And the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments on another EPA regu lation, on greenhouse gas emissions, yesterday. 
These are just the latest in a long line of initiatives designed to address important energy and 
environmental policy problems during a period of unparalleled congressional grid lock Politica l 
sc ientists have documented the "how" and the "why" of gridlock, showing that congressional parties 
are far more ideologically polarized now than at any time 1n the modern regulatory era. This creates 
incentives for the minority party to use tools like the filibuster to stop the ma1ority, and for the ma1ority 
to use its control over the agenda to prevent legislation that may command majority support, but not 
the support of the majority party. (This is the so-called "Hastert rule," used sometimes in the House of 
Representatives.) 
This polarization and gridlock has prevented Congress from updating any major environmenta l statute 
in more than 30 years. Congress' record of inattention to energy legislation is almost as impressive. 
Meanwhile, life goes on, and the environmental and energy regulators - mainly, EPA and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG ) - have continued to grapple with the new problems that 
have arisen within their jurisdiction over the last two decades, struggling to fit old statutory reg imes to 
these new problems. In a forthcoming artic le, my co-author Jody Freeman and I explore what this 
state of affairs means for regulatory policymaking, and fo r courts charged with reviewing the decisions 
agencies make in response to these challenges . 
We focus much of our attention on how these agencies have addressed the pressing problem of 
climate change and the need for a cleaner energy mix. After the Supreme Court endorsed the notion 
that the greenhouse gases (GHGs) were pollutants subject to Clean Air Act regulation in 2007, and 
Congress subsequently failed to enact legislation addressing GHG em issions in 2009-10, EPA 
promu lgated a succession of rules, including: (1 ) the "tailpipe rule," regulating emissions from motor 
vehicles, (2) the "tailoring ru le," establish ing the EPA's basic approach to regu lating greenhouse 
gases from stationary sources, and (3) proposed GHG emissions standards for new power plants. 
The agency is also working on its program for limiting GHG emissions from existing power plants. 
Meanwhile, the FERG has established or proposed new rules designed to make it more profitable for 
renewable sources of electricity (wind and solar) and demand side resources to participate in 
wholesale electricity markets (Orders 764 and 7 45, respectively) . And its Order 1000 is designed to 
facilitate the construction of new transmission lines that will bring clean, renewable power to market, 
in part by authorizing transmission planners to spread the cost of those lines more widely. 
In each of these cases. the agency was faced with the task of adapting an old statute - the Clean Air 
Act or the Federal Power Act - to a set of problems that were probably not foreseen by Congress 
when it enacted the statute in the fi rst place. We explore these adaptations in our article, but there is 
no question that for some of these regulatory initiatives, the statutory fit is awkward. Nevertheless, 
we show that in the ir efforts to discharge their statutory mandates, EPA and FERG have not taken 
advantage of congressional gridlock and simply "gone for broke" when wrestl ing with problems of fit. 
Instead they proceed cautiously and strategica lly, cogn izant of the preferences of their politica l 
overseers and the risk of being overturned in the courts. The case before the Supreme Court 
illustrates th is point: the parties are effective ly arguing about the legality of the EPA's dec ision to 
regulate only a small fraction of the GHG emission sources that would be covered by a lite ra l read ing 
of the Clean Air Act. 
EPA and FERG have also behaved in ways that are surprising ly accountable, not just to the president 
but also to Congress, the courts, and the larger public. This public accountabi lity claim is supported 
by the most recent University of Texas Energy Poll, in which majorities in every part isan/ideological 
category.'.._ except "Strong Republicans" and "Libertarians" supported "taking steps to reduce carbon 
emissions. And in every ideological category, 70 percent or more supported "federal government 
action to develop renewable technologies " On clean energy issues, these agenc ies' initiatives seem 
to be more in line with public opinion than congressional Republicans. 
Naturally, th is being the United States, each of these regulatory initiatives has been or is being 
challenged in the cou rts, so federal judges must decide in each case whether the agency has 
stretched the statutory language too far. In discharging their judicial review function, courts will need 
to recognize that in the new strategic environment of regu latory policymaking (from which Congress is 
absent), either the executive branch or the courts decide policy outcomes. In other words, if courts 
"kick the problem back to Congress," that is a de facto policy decision in favor of the status quo, in 
most cases. 
Professor Freeman and I argue that agencies are better suited than courts to do the work of updating 
these old statutes, and that the case for deferring to agenc ies in that task is stronger than ever with 
Congress largely absent from the policymaking process . The agency is the legally designated 
custodian of the statute (so designated by the enacting Congress). so the agency may have the 
superior claim to interpret the statute's application to new problems during periods of congressional 
quiescence. 
So far the courts have been fa irly deferential to these agenc ies' interpretations of their enabling 
legislation , but many of the initiatives listed above (like EPA's tailoring rule) are before reviewing 
courts right now. So it remains to be seen whether the courts will stop these clean energy initiatives 
in their tracks. They ought not to do so, because in these issue areas, the agencies are making 
policy choices with broad public support, and are doing so by creative ly adapting their enabling 
statutes, not bend ing or breaking them. 
: The seven categories were Strong Democrat, Somewhat/Lean Democrat, Strictly Independent, 
Libertarian, Somewhat Lean Republican, and Strong Republican . 
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